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ABSTRACT This article looks at the attempts made by British governments after the Seven
Years War to reduce colonial consumption of continental European manufactures. It begins
by sketching the pre-war background, focusing first on the availability of European goods in
North America and the Caribbean and then on British debates about foreign commodity
penetration of the Atlantic colonies. The next part charts the emergence after 1763 of a
political consensus in London on the need to give British goods added advantage in
American markets. The article goes on to suggest reasons for the forming of this consensus,
and finally considers the success of the measures introduced by British governments to
diminish colonial purchases of European products.
One of the great benefits that Britain could expect from its colonies was ‘the Consumption of
our Manufactures’. So wrote Thomas Whately, secretary to the treasury in George
Grenville’s government of 1763-5. He went on to argue that colonial markets could be
secured for British products by actively discouraging foreign competition.1 Grenville’s
ministry is known primarily for its ill-fated efforts to tax America. Grenville’s stamp duties,
the most notorious of the new taxes, provoked an enormous uproar in the colonies, which was
quietened only by the repeal of the offending legislation. Given that the Stamp Act crisis
began the deterioration in imperial relations that ultimately led to war and independence, the
concentration on this aspect of the Grenville government’s work is hardly surprising. But
2here we focus on its less familiar attempts to reduce colonial purchases of continental
European goods. This paper looks at the measures taken against foreign products, tries to
explain why protecting colonial markets became a new political orthodoxy after the Seven
Years War (1756-63), and assesses the impact of increased discrimination against continental
European commodities. Other scholars have highlighted the greater importance that British
politicians and public attached to empire from 1763.2 Interesting work has also been done on
post-war attempts to crack down on smuggling.3 But no-one – to the best of my knowledge –
has looked specifically at the efforts of Grenville and his successors to curb colonial
consumption of European manufactures.
Why should historians care about such a seemingly arcane subject? An examination of
the nature, origins, and success of imperial protectionism in the dozen years after 1763 tells
us very little of importance about the coming of the American Revolution, the dominant
episode of the period in many historical accounts. But it has relevance to a number of other
scholarly concerns relating to eighteenth-century Britain and its empire. As historians
become interested again in mercantilism,4 the current study reminds us that, despite signs of a
loosening of the British system of trade regulation – such as the Free Ports Act of 1766 – in
important ways the system became more not less restrictive in the years immediately
preceding Adam Smith’s famous criticisms in the Wealth of Nations.5 By investigating the
development of imperial protection we can gain some insights into processes of government
decision making, and the role of lobbying, which historians have sought to illuminate in
recent years.6 Such an investigation gives us further cause to regard the Seven Years War, a
conflict that has attracted much attention lately, as an important event in both British and
imperial history.7 This study also sheds light on the relationship between Britain’s
involvement with continental Europe and its imperial interests, a subject on which historians
have differed much in the past decade.8 And, finally, it suggests that the ready availability of
3continental European manufactures in America – even after the introduction of measures to
reduce their consumption – qualifies the established picture of the colonies as cultural
provinces of Britain.9
We begin by looking briefly at colonial consumption of continental European goods prior
to 1763. This first section of the paper draws on a variety of testimony, official and
unofficial, some of it dating back to the seventeen-forties, to paint a picture of the availability
of such goods in North America and the West Indies. The second part examines the pre-
Seven Years War debates in Britain about foreign products in colonial markets, and seeks to
account for the triumph of the mercantile interests favouring easy access over those who
wanted to see greater protection for British manufactures. With this background in place, we
can move on to the main part of the paper. In the third section we consider the actions of the
Grenville ministry and the emergence of a new political consensus on the need to limit
continental European penetration of British colonial markets. The fourth section attempts to
explain that consensus. We turn in the fifth section to an assessment of the success of the
measures taken to reduce consumption of foreign European goods in North America and the
British Caribbean.
The focus throughout is on manufactures and agricultural outputs created in Europe itself.
Excluded from consideration are the imperial commodities of the European powers, such as
Asian tea and textiles brought to Europe by the Dutch East India Company and then
smuggled into British North America and the West Indies, and French Caribbean molasses
(semi-refined sugar, used in rum making), which appear to have entered the British colonies
in large volumes.10 Grenville and his successors clearly viewed these products of other
empires – or at least their molasses – as distinct from continental European manufactures.
While British governments after the Seven Years War sought to use fiscal means to reduce
4colonial consumption of European manufactured goods, they did the opposite with foreign
molasses, lowering duties to increase legal sales and therefore boost state revenues.
-I-
The seventeenth-century Navigation Acts decreed that continental European products
destined for English colonial markets should come first through an English port, where they
would be charged customs duties. Analyses of the records compiled by the customs service
suggest that re-exports comprised twenty-seven per cent of total English exports to America
and West Africa in 1751-4. Included in the lists of goods destined for the Atlantic colonies
are Mediterranean oils and fruits, Spanish, Portuguese, German, and French wines, and, most
importantly, textiles from Italy, the Low Countries, France, Russia, and especially Germany.
In the same period, linen re-exports to America were worth an average of about £301,000 a
year.11 But this figure includes at least some Irish linen exported via England; the portion
that originated in continental European countries is unclear. A better impression of the scale
of colonial importation of continental European linens can perhaps be found in a document in
the papers of Horatio Walpole, surveyor and auditor-general of American revenues, which
states that in 1753 some 6.8 million yards of foreign linens were re-exported from Britain,
mainly to the colonies in North America and the West Indies.12 To put this figure in
perspective, two years earlier, Irish linen exports to British North America and the Caribbean
islands added up to a rather less impressive 1.2 million yards; coincidentally, the same
quantity as the annual average of Scotland’s total linen exports in 1748-52.13
Official sources tell us nothing about illicit commerce, carried on outside the restrictions
of the Navigation Acts. A letter in Walpole’s papers refers to the considerable extent of
direct trade between continental Europe and the British territories across the Atlantic,
5particularly the unauthorized colonial import of goods from Europe; ‘a practice’ that the
anonymous author describes as ‘extremely pernicious’.14 The invoice books of Brand and
Schuyler, New York merchants, show that the company imported glassware, linens, and fruits
directly from Hamburg in the seventeen-forties and early ’fifties. The same firm engaged in
another illegal trade; the invoice books reveal regular shipments of continental European
linens to New York from the Dutch Caribbean.15 Illicit exchanges also took place between
the foreign and British West Indies. The British islands, according to another source, relied
on soap manufactured in Marseilles, which reached them via the French Caribbean colonies.
Marseilles soap apparently won out on quality grounds over British soap, which melted in the
heat and became ‘totally unserviceable’.16
Reports on illicit trade, and fugitive details of some of its features, leave us no nearer any
true sense of its scale. Smuggling, by its very nature, is not susceptible to quantification.
Perhaps the best way to gain an impression of the extent of continental European penetration
of colonial markets is not by trying to add together the figures for legal trade and estimates
(or guesses) of the magnitude of clandestine commerce, but rather by focusing on sources
that shed light on the goods actually purchased by or for the inhabitants of the British
colonies in North America and the West Indies. Contemporary publications and newspaper
adverts, as well as private diaries, letters, account-books, and inventories, provide us with
glimpses of colonial consumption of continental European products. The picture is
necessarily fragmentary; but at least it gives us a sense of the widespread availability of
continental European commodities.
Affluent Americans and West Indians, rather than rely on locally produced rum,
consumed copious quantities of Portuguese wine, given preferential access to British colonial
markets in recognition of the long-standing Anglo-Portuguese alliance. Madeira dominated,
but other Portuguese vintages reached the British Atlantic provinces.17 Large quantities of
6‘Lisbon wine’ appear to have been consumed at Harvard College; the president’s diary for
one day in 1760 records his having eleven dozen bottles taken from the college cellars.18
Wines from other European countries were also readily available. According to a German
visitor to Philadelphia in 1750, German and Spanish wine was ‘obtainable in all taverns’.19
French wines, despite the high duties they bore, seem to have reached colonial consumers,
too. As a South Carolina doctor noted in 1763, notwithstanding large-scale purchase of
Madeira, ‘few Gentlemen are without Claret, Port, Lisbon, and other Wines, of the French,
Spanish, or Portugal Vintages’.20 Robert Pringle, a Charleston merchant, illustrates the
point: his journal for the mid-seventeen-forties records extensive drinking, selling, and gifting
of claret.21
European textiles, as both the official trade statistics and scattered accounts of smuggled
goods suggest, particularly attracted colonial consumers. A Philadelphia newspaper
advertised the availability of ‘German serges’ in Samuel Neave’s store in June 1741; mention
of the same fabrics, and many others of continental European provenance, appear in
newspapers published in other colonial towns around the same time.22 Governor James Glen
of South Carolina noted in 1749 the large numbers of ‘Linnens of all kinds’ purchased in his
colony, many of them German, and also the ‘considerable quantitys of the fine Laces of
Flanders, the finest Dutch Linnens & French Cambricks’.23 Between 1754 and 1757,
according to adverts in the New York Mercury, German linens and ‘Russia duck’ (a coarse
kind of linen) were available in Greg and Cunningham’s New York City store.24 A few years
later, in 1759, an invoice of goods brought to Jamaica on board the Milford for use at Spring
Plantation includes ‘Flaxen Osnaburgs’ and ‘Patterbons’ – which we can identify as two
types of cloth, the first named after Osnabrück, the second, Padderborn, textile-producing
towns in north west Germany.25
7Some of these items, admittedly, might not have been what they seemed. Textiles
described as ‘Osnaburgs’ or ‘Oznebrigs’ were not always the German originals; Scottish,
Irish, and English linen-makers produced their own imitations, which sold well across the
Atlantic.26 Other fabric names can similarly deceive. ‘Hollands’, for instance, were not
always Dutch.27 Even so, in 1744 the Westminster House of Commons learned from expert
witnesses that German linens dominated the British Caribbean, where they were used to
clothe the enslaved workforce on the plantations. Indeed, a recent study has highlighted the
presence in London of large numbers of German merchants, who established themselves in
the metropolis at least partly to facilitate access to British imperial markets.28 The account-
books of Case and Shuttleworth, merchants in Kingston, Jamaica, suggest that ten years after
the House of Commons’ investigation, ‘Oznabriggs’ – almost certainly German – were still
competing strongly with Irish linen.29
-II-
Before 1763, mid-eighteenth-century British governments, despite the intentions of the
Navigation Acts, appear to have been largely unconcerned by the availability of continental
European products in the Atlantic colonies. Irritation might be expressed about the extent of
smuggling, which denied revenue to the state, but little anxiety was voiced by ministers about
the penetration of legally imported foreign goods. One could even argue that successive
British governments aided and abetted continental European re-exports to the Atlantic
colonies. British politicians admittedly had few qualms about increasing the import duties on
foreign textiles entering Britain during wartime, when revenue was much needed; a five
percent rise was introduced in 1748, at the end of the War of the Austrian Succession, and
another five per cent in 1759, during the Seven Years War.30 But German textile sales in
8North America and the West Indies benefited from the ability of the merchants who imported
these goods (and other continental manufactures) into Britain and then re-exported them to
America to claim a ‘drawback’, or refund, of part of the original import duty. As a result,
colonial consumers could purchase German linens more cheaply than could their British
counterparts.31
Unsurprisingly, British and Irish linen producers disliked the drawback and agitated for its
removal. In the late-seventeen-thirties, they petitioned the Westminster Parliament, asking it
to recognize that the drawback created a ‘great Hindrance’ to overseas and colonial
‘consumption of our own Produce and Manufactures’ and to take steps to help them.32 Their
dissatisfaction was reduced in 1743 when the House of Commons agreed to introduce
bounties on certain types of British linen exports;33 Irish linens that were deemed to be ‘the
property of some person resident’ in Britain or the North American colonies benefited from
the same subsidy.34 After having received complaints from merchants and manufacturers that
the help given had been of little use to producers of coarse cloth, parliament extended the
bounties to other sorts of British linens in 1746.35 But in 1753 the bounties lapsed, and in the
period before they were reintroduced in 1756, British linen interests pressed hard for the
termination of the drawback on foreign re-exports. Opponents of the drawback, as in the
seventeen-thirties, argued that it effectively subsidized the competitors of British and Irish
linen-makers, providing foreigners with privileged access to overseas and colonial markets.36
On the other side of the debate, the anonymous writer of a paper on ‘Reasons against
taking off the Drawbacks on the Exportation of Foreign Linnens’ claimed that as the British
linen industry was unable to satisfy even home demand, British linen producers had no
reason to be fearful about continental European linen sales across the Atlantic.37 The author
of this piece might well have been Denys de Berdt, a prominent member of London’s
mercantile community, who had the ear of Westminster politicians, particularly, it appears,
9Horatio Walpole, son of Sir Robert. We can see de Berdt as a representative of a particular
lobby – those London merchants who traded with both the Continent and the colonies, taking
English woollens to the first and returning with cargoes of foreign linens for the second. In
two other documents, penned in 1755, and in Horatio Walpole’s papers, de Berdt detailed the
case that the drawback served British interests.38 Were the drawback removed, he claimed,
legitimate trade between the Continent and Britain’s Atlantic empire would be so
disadvantaged that foreign merchants would be incentivized to send their goods directly to
the colonies, in contravention of the Navigation Acts; smuggling, in other words, would
almost certainly increase. As a result of the reduction in legitimate trade, customs revenues
derived from foreign linen imports into Britain would decline. Most importantly, in de
Berdt’s view, if foreigners sent fewer linens to Britain, then they would purchase fewer
English woollen goods in return. He even speculated that they might start producing more
woollens of their own, reducing still further English woollen exports to the Continent.
We know that questions relating to the linen trade divided MPs in this period, but
unfortunately we know little of the substance of their disagreements.39 De Berdt’s point about
a loss of revenue might well have influenced those who defended the status quo, but his
arguments about the deleterious impact on the English woollen interest probably clinched the
case for retaining the drawback. Woollen cloth had been England’s primary export
commodity for hundreds of years, and in the early seventeen-fifties many parliamentarians
still responded instinctively to any threat to its overseas sales. English linen producers were
less well supported. Linen-making was much more important in Scotland and Ireland, where
it received state support; in the Irish case partly to compensate for Westminster’s attempts to
stop Irish woollens competing with English. But Scottish and Irish linen interests were
usually outgunned at Westminster by the numerous friends of English woollen exports.40 The
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disappointment of the linen producers subsided quickly, however, for in 1756, as we have
seen, Parliament reinstated the bounties on the export of British linens.
-III-
From 1763, George Grenville and his ministerial colleagues took a tougher line on
continental European goods entering colonial markets. Thomas Whately, writing in a
pamphlet published in 1765 to defend the government’s record, argued that ‘Colonies are
only Settlements made in distant Parts of the World, for the Improvement of Trade; but if
they were allowed to transfer the Benefits of their Commerce to any other Country than that
from which they came, they would destroy the very Purposes of their Establishment’. It was
vital, he maintained, ‘To encourage the Consumption of our own Produce and Manufactures,
in preference to those of other Countries’.41 Whately does not appear to have been influenced
by contemporary writings on political economy; despite his penchant for abstract and general
statements, he wrote as a politician justifying Grenville’s measures, not as a participant in a
theoretical debate about colonial trade. His ready pen perhaps retrospectively conferred a
greater coherence on government policy than it truly possessed – not an uncommon failing in
ministerial apologists – even so, we can see, both from Whately’s account and other
evidence, that Grenville’s administration tried to curb colonial consumption of foreign
manufactures in two ways: first by clamping down on smuggling and secondly by legislative
discrimination against legal re-exports from Britain to North America and the West Indies.
Whately’s disapproval of breaches of what he believed should be an exclusive trading
system pervades his writings. The aim of the seventeenth-century Navigation Acts, he
argued, was to ‘confine the European Commerce of the Colonies to the Mother Country’;
when the colonists disregarded the Navigation Acts, their trade was ‘diverted from its proper
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Channel’ and the American provinces became, as Whately memorably put it, ‘no longer
British Colonies, but Colonies of the Countries they trade to’.42 He maintained that it was
common practice for British ships to collect cargoes of foreign goods, which they pretended
were destined for the colonies of that European country, but then to call at a British port, load
a small quantity of British manufactures on board, and proceed to a British overseas territory,
where the whole cargo – British and foreign – would be put ashore and passed off as
British.43 He was even more exercised by direct American and West Indian purchase of
continental European goods, which were shipped to the British colonies in exchange for their
own products. ‘Large Quantities’, Whately wrote, ‘are annually sent … from the Ports of
Holland and other Countries on the German Ocean’, while more were ‘smuggled in smaller
Parcels from the Foreign, particularly from the Dutch Islands’.44
Grenville shared Whately’s hostility to this illegal commerce. In October 1763, an order
in council, based on a treasury report, called for the tightening up of customs enforcement in
North America, the authors’ urging ‘suppression of the clandestine and prohibited trade with
foreign nations’.45 The shorthand diary kept by Nathaniel Ryder, a government supporting
MP, records Grenville as announcing during the budget debate of 9 March 1764 that it was
‘particularly desirable to prevent intercourse of America with foreign nations’ and regretting
that ‘many colonies have such a trade’.46 The testimony of James Harris, a lord of the
treasury, indicates how seriously Grenville took the matter. On 7 April of the same year,
Harris dined with Grenville, and noted his chief as saying ‘in the ensuing Summer that he
intended to get all the acctts he was able from Petersburg, Amsterdam, Rotterdam, France &c
of the Smugling from those Places to our American Settlements, in order to Station our Ships
of War, So as most effectively to prevent it.’47
Grenville’s wide-ranging overhaul of duties and commercial regulations, brought together
in the Revenue Act of 1764, was the second aspect of his attempt to tackle the problem of
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continental European penetration of colonial markets. To most historians the important
element of the act was the reduction in the duty on foreign molasses entering the North
American colonies from the prohibitive six pence per gallon, set by the so-called Molasses
Act of 1733, to a revenue-raising three pence per gallon. By comparison, Grenville’s
measures relating to continental European manufactures, especially textiles, though usually
mentioned in most historical accounts, are given little notice.48 Yet these measures marked a
dramatic departure from the approach of earlier governments. The 1764 legislation included
provisions to deal more effectively with clandestine trade: an elaborate system of
documentation was introduced to combat fraudulent attempts to pass continental European
manufactures off as British products; as a further deterrent, smugglers would be tried at a
newly created vice-admiralty court, sitting without juries, at Halifax, Nova Scotia. But, more
importantly, legal trade in foreign manufactures was also targeted: the Revenue Act withdrew
the drawback on nearly all foreign re-exports to the British Atlantic colonies (drawbacks
continued on re-exports to other areas of the globe, and on some Asian textiles going to
America) and at the same time imposed new duties of three shillings per thirteen ells (just
over sixteen yards) on certain types of foreign linen cloth re-exported to America.49
Grenville left only limited clues as to his logic. An undated document in James Harris’s
papers suggests that the government hoped to raise £50,000 in revenue from the new duties
on foreign linens, which would contribute, like the more famous molasses duty, and duties on
wines and Asian calicos going across the Atlantic, to covering the costs of the regular army
based in North America after the Seven Years War.50 We also know from a later
parliamentary enquiry that the removal of the drawback on almost all re-exports to the
colonies boosted government income; repayments on re-exports fell from £55,626 in 1763 to
£38,303 in 1765.51 In the context of the increased costs of imperial defence after 1763, and
the enormity of the fiscal challenge facing post-war British governments, ministers no doubt
13
welcomed any financial contributions, however modest.52 But revenue-raising was not
Grenville’s only objective and – at least in the case of the drawback, which was removed
only on products going to America – probably not even the main one. As Whately
emphasized, the new duties made foreign textiles less competitive in colonial markets,53
while the ending of the drawback on re-exports to the Atlantic colonies meant that continental
European goods generally became more expensive to Americans: ‘in many Articles’,
Whately wrote, ‘this will give a Turn in favour of British Produce and Manufactures’.54
Did Grenville’s approach reflect the influence of lobbying by interested parties? We
know that his government was prepared, like earlier governments, to listen to individuals and
groups representing trade or manufacturing; the 1764 Currency Act, controlling the issuing of
paper money in the colonies, appears to have been a direct response to the pleas of British
merchants fearful of depreciation.55 But when Grenville was pursuing his own agenda, he
showed a steely determination to secure what he wanted. He considered ending the drawback
from the moment he took office, at a time when British linen producers were not vociferously
pressing for greater protection.56 He did, admittedly, propose ways to soften the blow for
those merchants who objected;57 but his concessions were on matters of detail, not
fundamentals. Just as with his beloved stamp duties scheme, Grenville was willing to
negotiate on the fine points of implementation, but not on the principle.58
Grenville’s Revenue Act met with very little parliamentary opposition. We can attribute
its easy ride at least partly to the distraction of the duke of Newcastle, one of the
government’s chief enemies, who showed more concern for the election of a new high
steward for the University of Cambridge than for contesting the American duties.59 The
criticism voiced by opposition MPs seems to have concentrated on the issue of the rate that
the government proposed to charge on foreign molasses. Several speakers in the budget
debate argued for a lower level of two pence per gallon, on the grounds that it would produce
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more revenue, not less.60 In a subsequent division on the matter, a fortnight after the original
debate, some fifty-five MPs supported a two pence duty, only to be outvoted by the 147 who
favoured Grenville’s three pence.61
But the opposition showed no inclination to query Grenville’s measures against foreign
manufactures. William Baker, a supporter of the duke of Newcastle, effectively endorsed
Grenville’s approach; according to Ryder’s account, Baker said that so far as foreign
commodities were concerned, ‘he thinks it proper to lay high duty’. John Huske, an
American by birth and a merchant by occupation, and like Baker associated with the
opposition, was equally sure that the removal of the drawback on foreign re-exports was a
positive step; ‘a bounty to our own manufactures’, as he described it.62 Defenders of the
drawback were few in number, and by no means regular opponents of the government.
Richard Glover, perhaps Grenville’s most persistent parliamentary critic on this issue, usually
supported the ministry. His opposition appears to have been based on his fears that
Grenville’s proposal would inadvertently increase smuggling and encourage the colonists to
produce more of their own linens,63 but may have originated in his interests as a ‘Hamburgh
Merchant’.64
The next government, led by the marquis of Rockingham, and including the duke of
Newcastle’s supporters, set about reversing many of Grenville’s initiatives.65 The most well-
known of the new administration’s over-turnings was the repeal of Grenville’s American
Stamp Act of 1765, a piece of political drama that captured the attention of many
contemporaries – on both sides of the Atlantic – and has continued to dazzle modern
historians of the period.66 By comparison, the Rockingham government’s attack on the 1764
Revenue Act has attracted much less notice. William Dowdeswell, Rockingham’s chancellor
of the exchequer, produced his own wide-ranging commercial overhaul, which included a
reduction in the levy on molasses imported into North America to just a penny per gallon,
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chargeable on both British and foreign Caribbean molasses. Dowdeswell later explained that,
so far as the molasses duty was concerned, his aim was to increase revenue;67 but Grenville
predictably complained that, in response to lobbying, the new ministry was ‘taking off Tax
after Tax’.68 Even John Yorke, a lord of trade in Rockingham’s government, noted with
more than a hint of disapproval in May 1766 that his colleagues were ‘oversetting every
American idea that ever was establish’d’.69 Edmund Burke, Rockingham’s secretary,
responded to such criticism with some delight: ‘We are, it is true, demolishing the whole
Grenvillian Fabrick.’70
In one crucial respect, however, Grenville’s regulatory edifice was left intact.
Dowdeswell’s Revenue or Plantation Duties Act of 1766 did not overturn the previous
government’s attempts to reduce colonial consumption of continental European products.
The drawback on re-exports to the colonies was not restored, and though Dowdeswell hinted
that he would like to move ‘to a duty ad valorem’,71 in the end he offered this concession
only on Asian fabrics; the 1766 Act repealed Grenville’s duties on European linens only to
replace them with identical flat-rate charges. Whately, as inclined as Grenville to criticise
the Rockinghamites at every opportunity, fretted in May 1766 that the new administration’s
Free Ports Bill, designed to permit most foreign Caribbean produce into the British Empire at
very low rates of duty, or none at all, would allow French manufactured goods to enter the
British colonies in disguise. ‘I do not see why the French may not set up two or three looms
for cotton stuffs, and in like manner establish other fictitious manufactures in their islands’,
he wrote, ‘and under that colour supply our colonies with whatever they please’.72 But even
the partisan Whately conceded that if this were to happen it would be an inadvertent
consequence of the legislation, not a deliberate policy.
No evidence points to the Rockingham government’s being any more willing than its
predecessor to condone continental European manufactures competing with British goods in
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colonial markets. On the contrary, some of Rockingham’s supporters argued as strongly as
Whately and Grenville for the necessity of excluding foreign commodities from the British
colonies. One unnamed government member (or advisor) pressed for the intensification of
Grenville’s tough line on smuggling: ‘as to the French, Dutch & Danes’, he is reported to
have said, ‘He would make the Laws stricter against their Importing or Exporting any Goods
to & from our Colonies (if stricter Laws could be framed) for they are the great smuglers of
European Goods into our Colonies’.73 Even the aged Newcastle, who first came to
prominence in the days of Sir Robert Walpole, when commercial regulations were enforced
with much less vigour, agreed with John Roberts, a lord of trade, that ‘Certainly Some Care
must be taken, To prevent The Introduction of Manufactures, &c, which are now furnished
from the Mother Country’.74 The 1766 Free Ports Act, notwithstanding Whately’s anxiety,
specifically stipulated that no non-British manufactures were to be admitted to the free ports
established on Dominica and Jamaica.75
The Rockingham administration’s attitude was perhaps most clearly demonstrated in a
clause of the 1766 Plantation Duties Act that forbade any American goods from being
shipped directly to continental European ports north of Cape Finisterre. The Navigation Acts
prohibited the direct export of specifically identified items from the colonies to mainland
Europe, but imposed no blanket ban on the direct export of all American commodities. The
Rockingham government’s aim in introducing this general prohibition, as the wording of the
1766 Act itself unambiguously states, was to stop American vessels making the journey home
with cargoes of European manufactures collected at such places as Hamburg or Amsterdam.
Charles Garth, a British MP and London agent for the South Carolina assembly, reported in
September 1766 that the treasury had insisted on the insertion of the clause as a result of
information given to the ministry by London merchants who knew of ‘unwarrantable
practices’ by which continental European goods were clandestinely exported directly to
17
North America. This news must have come as a blow to Garth’s South Carolinian
colleagues, who for some time had been pressing for permission to export rice directly to
northern Europe (Sir Robert Walpole’s ministry had granted the same dispensation for
southern Europe as long ago as 1731).76
By the time that Garth wrote to the South Carolina assembly, yet another new
government was in office. At the beginning of August 1766, Rockingham was replaced by
the duke of Grafton, the nominal head of a ministry formed under the influence of William
Pitt, who now became the earl of Chatham. The new government contained many ministers
who had served under Rockingham, including Charles Townshend, who became chancellor
of the exchequer. Townshend told Garth that he wanted to give the 1766 Plantation Duties
Act a fair trial before considering any changes.77 At first, Townshend looked as though he
might be more willing than any of his recent predecessors to admit foreign products into the
colonies. He announced a new duty to be charged on selected imports into America, to pay
for the salaries of colonial governors and judges, in order to free them from financial reliance
on their local legislatures. His principal aim, as he explained to Grafton, was a wholesale
reform of colonial government, which would secure ‘independent Salaries for the civil
officers in North America’, making them more responsive to instructions from London and
less inclined to bow to local pressure.78 In May 1767, Townshend envisaged continental
European fruits, oils, and wine as suitable objects for the new duty. But he was simply
concerned with revenue; he had no wish to reduce sales of these foreign products in the
colonies. As a result, to compensate for the extra costs imposed by the new duty, which
might reduce consumption, he proposed to allow the fruit, oil, and wine to be shipped directly
from Spain and Portugal, rather than through a British port, as the Navigation Acts required.79
But he abandoned his plans when he faced opposition to direct export to the colonies, and
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decided instead to lay his duties on tea and a small set of non-essential manufactured goods –
glass, lead, artists’ colours, and paper – of both British and foreign manufacture.80
Even if he had persisted with the original proposal, Townshend’s liberality was distinctly
limited. He was prepared to make it easier for certain continental European goods to enter
the British colonies, but only those that offered no competition to British manufactures; at no
stage does he seem to have contemplated any change in the duty chargeable on German and
other continental textiles imported into British America. The Grafton government also carried
on Grenville’s work in trying to eliminate, or greatly reduce, smuggling. In December 1766,
the earl of Shelburne, secretary of state in the new administration, ordered General Thomas
Gage, the commander-in-chief of the army in North America, to ‘spare no pains to be well
informed of the several Species of Smuggling in the different Provinces, the different
Countries with which the illicit Trade is carried on; the Arts and Practices used to evade the
Laws, and the most effectual Method of detecting and putting a Stop to them.’81 In late June
1767, just days after Townshend’s duties had received royal assent, the government secured
legislation creating a board of American customs commissioners; the intention was further to
improve the efficiency of the customs service in North America. The following year, an
order in council created more vice-admiralty courts to speed up the prosecution of violations
of the trade laws.82
Lord North, chancellor of the exchequer after Townshend died, and prime minister from
the beginning of 1770, seems to have shared the view of Grenville and Dowdeswell that the
colonies should be markets to which British goods had favoured access. While he repealed
Townshend’s duties (apart from the one on tea), he maintained the fiscal discrimination
against foreign linens introduced in 1764 and confirmed in 1766. Indeed, while North was
first minister, the discrimination increased; in 1771 the subsidy on the export of certain types
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of British linens, introduced in 1743 and 1746 and revived in 1756, was extended to new
sorts of linen fabric, giving an added advantage to British products in colonial markets.83
-IV-
How do we explain the emergence of the post-Seven Years War political consensus on the
need to reduce colonial consumption of continental European products? Given that the
campaign to remove the re-export drawback had probably foundered in the seventeen-fifties
partly because of the opposition of the woollen trade, perhaps part of the answer lies in
changes in the balance of power between English woollen and linen interests. On one
reading, wool remained dominant: in 1755 woollen exports accounted for forty-six per cent
of all English domestically produced exports, and in 1764 for forty-five per cent.84 But
English linen exports rose significantly with the reintroduction of the bounties in 1756. In
1755 they had stood at 3.8 million yards; by 1760 they had increased to 9.6 million yards.
Though they slipped back to 8.5 million yards in 1765, in 1770 they crept up to 8.8 million
and in 1775 to 9.2 million.85 If politicians at Westminster knew of this upward trajectory,
they might well have concluded that the linen industry deserved further encouragement.
We can be more certain that British politicians were keen to take full advantage of
imperial possibilities. The conquest of New France and the acquisition of Spanish Florida
gave the British crown authority over the whole of the eastern half of North America, from
Hudson Bay to the Gulf of Mexico and from the Atlantic to the Mississippi. The old British
colonies no longer had proximate European rivals to fear. Ministers in London,
contemplating this vast new dominion, and the security it conferred on the old colonies,
convinced themselves that what had been won in the war should not be available for
foreigners to exploit in its aftermath. Whately opened his 1765 pamphlet with the
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observation that ‘The immediate Defence of our Colonies from imminent Danger, was the
sole occasion of the last War: Their permanent Security has been effectually obtained by the
Peace … happily for this Country, … the Commercial Interests of Great Britain, are now
preferred to every other Consideration’. It followed, he stated, that what was needed now
was ‘a wise and proper use of the Colonies’, which included recognizing their importance as
consumers of British goods.86 In another pamphlet, written the next year, he argued that
Britain was ‘entitled’ to a protected American market as ‘the only return which the Colonies
can make for all the Benefits so lately’ given to them by the expulsion of the French from
Canada.87
Opponents of Grenville’s ministry did not use the language of entitlement, but we can be
confident that they recognized the importance of colonial markets for British manufactures.
That recognition surely informed the duke of Newcastle’s claim in February 1766 that ‘The
Total Cession by France of all their Possessions in America, I always thought, & said, was a
most Valuable Acquisition to this Country … We are now beginning to receive the Benefit of
it’; only Grenville’s ill-judged Stamp Act, Newcastle continued, had disrupted the enjoyment
of those benefits, and the sooner it were repealed, the better.88 William Pitt, another
opponent of the Stamp Act, was no less committed to the ideal of the colonies as consumers
of British goods. His ‘great Object’, an MP records Pitt as telling the House of Commons in
February 1766, was ‘always her [i.e., America’s] taking ye manufactures’.89 This keenness to
exploit imperial opportunities, shared by successive post-war governments, may well have
led Grenville’s political enemies first to acquiesce in and then to emulate his attempts to
reduce colonial purchases of continental European manufactured products.
Optimism about American potential was closely linked to pessimism about European
developments. British politicians looked hopefully across the Atlantic not simply because
they recognized the colonies’ intrinsic value, but also as a result of their fears that well-
21
established and closer markets were becoming less accessible. Mainland Europe took nearly
sixty-three per cent of English exports by value in 1752-4.90 But governments on the
Continent had begun to adopt more fiercely protectionist measures to foster their own
industries and boost their taxable wealth in the aftermath of the War of the Austrian
Succession (1740-48).91 The trend continued after the Seven Years War. In view of
increasing protectionism on the Continent, the Atlantic colonies, at least nominally under
British control, acquired a new importance. Whately argued that it was in America that ‘we
must … chiefly expect Compensation for the Disadvantages under which our Trade will
labour in European and other Markets’.92 The duke of Newcastle agreed. He wrote in
February 1766 that ‘Our American trade depends upon ourselves; or at least [is] not in the
Power of other Nations; which is not the Case of any other Branch of Trade.’93 Greater
protection for British colonial markets, initiated by Grenville and continued by his
successors, might therefore be seen as a response to changed circumstances in Europe.
-V-
Did the efforts to make the colonies a reliable market for British manufactured goods by
diminishing European competition have the desired effect? British and Irish linen exports to
North America certainly increased (up to an annual average of 6.5 million yards in 1769-
72)94 but this may have been due to the reintroduction of the bounty in 1756 rather than
Grenville’s new duties and the ending of the drawback. There is no evidence of a collapse in
foreign linen sales; on the contrary, official trade statistics suggest that they held up
remarkably well. Total re-exports constituted nineteen per cent of all English exports to
North America and West Africa in 1772-4, down from twenty-seven per cent in 1751-4. But
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Linen re-exports fell less noticeably than re-exports in general. As we have seen, English
linen re-exports were worth £301,000 a year in 1751-4; twenty years later, after the
introduction of a more discriminatory regime in 1764, their value had slipped, but only by
just over five per cent, to an annual average of £285,000.95 ‘An Account of all Foreign
Goods and produce’ legally imported into the British North American colonies in the year
from January 1769, apparently drawn up for Lord North, reveals that large quantities of
German, Dutch, and Russian linens, as well as Italian silks, continued to be sent across the
Atlantic.96
The official figures, as we have already noted, tell only part of the story. What about
illegal commerce? Many contemporaries claimed that Grenville’s tightening up of the trade
laws, and subsequent attempts to limit direct colonial commerce with northern Europe,
significantly diminished smuggling of all kinds, including of European manufactures. In
June 1764, Benjamin Franklin wrote from Philadelphia that ‘The Men of War station’d in our
several Ports are very active in their new Employment of Custom house Officers; a
Portmanteau cannot go between here and New York without being search’d; Every Boat stopt
and examin’d, and much Incumbrance by this means brought upon all Business.’97 The
following October, Cadwallader Colden, lieutenant-governor of New York, reported to the
board of trade that ‘since so many of his Majesty’s ships have been on the Coast’ the illegal
trade of his colony, chiefly with ‘Holland & Hamburgh’, ‘is thought to be at an end’.98 An
undated and anonymous paper sent to the duke of Newcastle, probably in the late spring or
summer of 1766, argued that the naval cutters ordered to intercept illegal trade had been so
successful that ‘an immense increase of the Importation of British manufactures in North
America’ had followed the reduction in the quantity of goods sent directly from ‘France,
Holland, Hamburgh, Russia & other parts of Europe’.99
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But we should not assume that these contemporary comments settle the matter. The
explanation for the rise in consumption of British manufactures offered by Newcastle’s
unknown correspondent may well have been wrong; the increase might not have been
connected with more rigorous enforcement of trade regulations, but the result of the recovery
in Atlantic trade that followed rapidly after the repeal of the Stamp Act and the ending of
American boycotts of British goods. Indeed, plenty of contemporary comment suggests that
smuggling continued, or even increased. After all, the removal of the drawback and the
introduction of new duties in 1764 added to the incentive to bring in goods illegally. Franklin
and Colden wrote at a time when naval intervention may well have been making an impact;
but the situation seems soon to have changed. As early as November 1764 – just a month
after his upbeat assessment of the impact of naval enforcement – Colden was beginning to
have his doubts about whether customs officers would be diligent enough to prevent illegal
commerce.100 In January 1767, the governor of New York received a report that smuggling
had taken off in the months since the repeal of the Stamp Act, exceeding anything seen in the
previous ten years.101 The next April, General Gage included ‘German Linnens, Hemp, Yarn
&ca from Holland Hamburgh, Curisoa, Monte Christie, St Eustatia’ in a list of ‘The principal
Articles Smuggled in to North America’. He also pointed out that illegal trade was still rife,
much of it carried out by ‘using small Vessels, which run into the little Rivers and Creeks
wherewith the Coast of America abounds.’102
Whether by illegal or legal routes, continental European goods continued to reach colonial
consumers. European wines remained popular with colonial elites, despite the increase in
their price caused by higher duties.103 British governments would surely not have been
concerned by the persistent use of this particular product: Grenville’s aim in raising duties on
wines – and Townshend’s a few years later – was not to reduce consumption, but boost
revenue. Foreign wines, after all, did not compete with a British equivalent. European
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manufactures, especially textiles, were another matter, as Whately and others made clear; yet
even these commodities, hampered as they were by higher duties and no re-export drawback,
continued to be consumed. In 1765, German fabrics, including ‘Mecklinburgh stuffs’ and
‘Dresden poplins’, appear among assorted European goods for sale in various shops in
Hartford, Connecticut.104 The next year, a South Carolina newspaper advertised the arrival of
‘German serges’ from London at a store in Beaufort.105 At the same time, Boston
publications recorded the availability of similar products in their town, as did newspapers in
Providence (Rhode Island), New York, and Philadelphia.106 Indeed, so many references
appear to foreign textiles (and other manufactured goods) in colonial newspapers in the
decade after 1764 that it seems hard to believe that there had been any significant reduction in
their penetration of the American market. Down in the West Indies, meanwhile, members of
the white elite showed no less inclination to buy the kind of foreign products that British
governments sought to discourage. The account-book of James Pinnock, a Jamaican
attorney, reveals that he purchased ‘Three pr French ribbed Silk Stockings’ at the end of
December 1766, and ‘a French Silk & Silver Waistcoat’ in December 1769.107
Colonial consumers in the seventeen-sixties and early ’seventies, accustomed over many
decades to purchasing large quantities of continental European products, were clearly
reluctant to change their habits. Colonial elites could no doubt afford to pay the higher costs
imposed by new duties and the removal of the drawback. But even less well-off consumers,
whom we might expect to have been deterred, appear to have continued to purchase foreign
manufactures. Perhaps, as Whately suggested, German immigrants brought fabrics with them
to sell in the colonies,108 and settlers of German origin (a third of Pennsylvania’s white
population, and maybe a tenth of the total in all the British mainland provinces) remained
attracted by the products of their homeland. The long-term fall in the production price of
foreign linens may well have been more important.109 But whatever the cause, Americans
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persisted in purchasing continental European manufactures, despite the best efforts of
ministers in London to persuade them to buy British.
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